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Resumen 
 
Este artículo sostiene que la ética jurídica debe formar parte de la educación jurídica 
obligatoria para ambos, como parte de una formación jurídica general y con el fin de 
preparar adecuadamente los abogados de las exigencias éticas de la práctica. Luego, 
basándose en la teoría moral, psicología moral y un estudio empírico de los estudian-
tes de derecho, este artículo analiza qué se debe enseñar y cómo. Más específicamen-
te, se pone de manifiesto las carencias de un sistema convencional ", basado en nor-
mas" enfoque para la enseñanza de ética, y las insuficiencias de un méto-
do cognitivo, en última instancia, llamando para la instrucción ética para desarrollar el 
carácter moral de los alumnos a través de una combinación de la enseñanza de la éti-
ca, la experiencia en el trato con casos reales a través de clínicas jurídicas estudiante y 
la reflexión sobre esa experiencia. 
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Abstract 
 
This article argues that legal ethics should form part of compulsory legal education in 
order both as part of a general legal education and in order to properly prepare law-
yers for the ethical demands of practice. Then, drawing on moral theory, moral psy-
chology and an empirical study of law students, this article looks at what should be 
taught and how. More specifically, it highlights the failings of a conventional, ‘rule-
based’ approach to ethics instruction, and the insufficiencies of a cognitive method, 
calling ultimately for ethics instruction to develop students’ moral character through a 
combination of ethics teaching, experience in dealing with actual cases through stu-
dent law clinics and reflection on such experience.  
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1. Introduction 
For centuries, universities have educated prospective lawyers without paying much, if 
indeed any, attention to the ethical issues which they might face in practice still less to 
seeking to ensure that they produce ethical lawyers. Then in the second half of the 
twentieth century, starting in the United States following the realisation that the ma-
jority of those responsible for the Watergate scandal had been legally educated (Daly 
et al 2004, 194) professional legal ethics has increasingly been introduced into the law 
curriculum. Given, however, that much still needs to be done to persuade all universi-
ties to introduce effective, and in many case any, legal ethics teaching, drawing on the 
ever-increasing literature on ethical education in the Anglo-American legal world, and 
in particular two of my own recent contributions (Nicolson 2008 and 2010), which in 
turn draw on moral theory, moral psychology and in one paper an empirical study of 
law students, this article addresses the why, what and how of ethics teaching in law 
schools. More specifically, it argues for the compulsory teaching of legal ethics in uni-
versities, and explores the questions of what should be taught and what methods are 
likely to be most effective in achieving the goals of ethical education. By contrast, I will 
largely ignore the question of what moral theories, values and principles students 
should be taught. Although I have strong views as to how lawyers should behave (e.g. 
Nicolson & Webb 1999), in addition to recognising their subjective nature and that 
attempts to inculcate particular moral stances not only conflict with the ethos of a uni-
versity education but are also likely to be counterproductive (e.g. Johnstone and 
Treuthart 1991, 75-7; Spaeth et al 1996, 161-2; Webb 1998a, passim) I strongly believe 
that it is far less important to attempt to ensure that prospective lawyers adopt partic-
ular moral positions as it is to try to ensure that they see morality as an central aspect 
of being a professional.  
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2. Why Teach Ethics?  
This is because to a large extent access to justice, and the quality of law and the legal 
process is in the hands of legal practitioners, who while representing their clients can 
and do cause much harm to their client’s opponents, third parties, the environment, 
the administration of justice or law itself. If the quality of law and legal justice is a cen-
tral concern of legal education, as I believe it should be, then it follows that so should 
the question of how lawyers behave, and hence the ethical values and principles which 
govern their behaviour. This is so whether legal education is aimed generally at edu-
cating students about law and legal thinking or more specifically at producing legal 
practitioners.  
In the latter case, however, there are additional reasons why ethics should be central 
to legal education. The core role of a lawyer is to assist and represent clients. Not least 
because clients might entrust important and often emotionally charged issues to the 
lawyer, the relationship is a highly personal one, which involves – or should involve - 
trust, commitment, care and consideration. Consequently, every single inter-reaction 
with and action on behalf of a client (or in the case of corporate clients, their human 
representatives) involves an ethical dimension (Burnham 1991, 105-8; Moliterno 1991, 
107-8). 
Legal ethics also matters because many, if not, most societies do not guarantee access 
to a lawyer, at least in civil cases. Lawyers must therefore make difficult decisions 
about how to allocate the privilege of their legal training, skill and experience: should it 
be based on money or justice and moral considerations? Do lawyers have a duty to 
help the most vulnerable even when they cannot pay? These are undoubtedly deci-
sions of an ethical nature. Personally, I believe that professionalism involves an ethical 
dimension and this includes some sort of commitment to ensuring that legal services 
are provided to those most in need rather than just the exercise of legal skills and obe-
dience of minimal standards of honesty and good behaviour. Otherwise, it is difficult to 
discern a difference between being a professional and being a businessman or a 
tradesman like a plumber. If professionalism does indeed extend to what I have else-
where termed ethical professionalism (Nicolson 2008, 146; see also Menkle-Meadow 
1994; on professionalism generally, Boon & Levin 2008, ch2; Nicolson & Webb 1999, 
ch3; and O’Dair 2001, ch3), then it seems obvious that one aim of legal education must 
be to ensure that students are aware of the ethical dimension to practice and hopeful-
ly also care about being an ethical professional. As Karl Llewellyn once put it, ‘tech-
niques without ideals is a menace; ideals without techniques are a mess.' (Lewellyn 
1952, 23, cited in O’Dair 2001, 7). Just as legal education could be said to have failed if 
students were not prepared in terms of legal knowledge and skills, so should it be re-
garded as failing if they were not prepared for the ethical dilemmas, and the pressures 
and temptations to act unethically that they will face in practice. Forewarned, gradu-
ates can seek careers which are more compatible with their moral values or at least 
cope better with the dilemmas they do go on to face. In other words, prior exposure to 
ethical issues at university may make students less likely to ignore the ethical dimen-
sion to legal practice once they graduate, and help those with a predisposition to act-
ing ethically to better cope with challenges in doing so.  
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3. Three Approaches to Teaching Legal Ethics 
For all these reasons, I think that legal ethics should be a compulsory part of legal edu-
cation. If so, what should be taught and how should it be taught? I will answer these 
questions through exploring three broad alternative approaches to ethical education - 
the conventional, the cognitive and the character-development models - and by exam-
ining the model of moral psychology underpinning each. To my mind, the psychological 
dimension to education is crucial. Unless education has an impact on the minds (if not 
personalities) of students it will be a wasted effort. I will therefore evaluate the bene-
fits of each approach largely in terms of their ability to satisfy the necessary psycholog-
ical conditions for moral behaviour and conclude that while there are aspects which 
can be taken from the conventional and particularly cognitive approaches, ethical edu-
cation should be aimed at developing moral character. 
a) The Conventional Approach 
Where ethics is taught in law schools, teaching is usually limited to the formal rules 
adopted by the professional bodies and takes the form of lectures, though this is often 
reinforced by small group discussions in which students are required to spot ethical 
issues in hypothetical problems and apply the rules to them. Moreover, ethical teach-
ing is usually confined to courses preparing graduates for practice after the main un-
dergraduate teaching in law, but even if incorporated into general legal education, 
ethics is rarely accorded more than one class among many others.  
As many have argued there are numerous problems with this approach to teaching 
ethics (e.g. Boon & Levin 2008, ch6; Boon 2002; Burridge & Webb 2007; Chapman 
2002; Nicolson & Webb 1999, 66-70; O’Dair 2001 ch4; Economides 1999; Duncan 
2002; Nicolson 2008, 147-54). First, even if ethics teaching takes place alongside other 
law courses, it is likely to be too limited and, especially if it follows a general legal edu-
cation where ethics teaching is usually conspicuous by its absence, too late to counter 
what is described variously as the hidden (Cramton 1978), latent (Pipkin 1979), implicit 
(Lesnick 1986, 634) or informal (Economides 1998, XVII) curriculum in legal education. 
These unarticulated value assumptions are communicated to students by example, by 
teaching methods, by curriculum choice as to what courses are or are not taught, at 
what level and for what credit points, and whether they are compulsory, and by stu-
dent culture and contacts with the legal profession. According to critics, by concentrat-
ing primarily on the teaching of legal rules and thinking like a lawyer, by separating 
issues of law from those of justice and ethics and largely disregarding the latter, by 
failing to challenge images of the lawyer as a legal technician whose function is con-
fined to manipulating law and facts in the interests of paying clients, traditional legal 
education conveys the implicit message that issues of ethics and justice are of little 
relevance to the real business of law, that rules are either there to be formalistically 
followed or manipulated in the interests of clients, and that a legal career is a means to 
success and financial rewards. And according to research albeit largely in the US, this 
tends to undermine student idealism about using law to promote justice, and to en-
gender moral and political cynicism, and a propensity towards ethically dubious behav-
iour (usefully summarised in Chapman 2002, 73-9). 
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If accurate, any teaching of ethics has a mountain to climb. But what is offered is too 
limited to even reverse the impact of the hidden curriculum, never mind ensure that 
prospective lawyers go on to behave as ethical professionals. According to psycholo-
gists, for someone to act morally they need to satisfy four psychological components 
(e.g. Rest 1984; Rest et al 1999; Rest & Narvaez 1994 esp. ch1). First, they need moral 
sensitivity in order to recognise moral problems in the first place. Secondly, they need 
the moral judgment to work out the correct response. Thirdly, moral commitment is 
required to ensure that they regard morality as important enough to take precedence 
over competing considerations like self-interest. Finally, moral actors need moral cour-
age in order to sustain this commitment in the face of competing pressures such as the 
demands of senior colleagues in law firms.  
At best, teaching the ethical rules contained in profession’s codes of conduct will only 
help with developing the sensitivity and judgment to recognise the possibility of 
breach of the rules and to understand how to apply the rules. But, leaving aside the 
fact that merely providing students with knowledge of rules does little to encourage, 
let alone a develop, a critical approach to their content, the rules promulgated by 
many professions are too vague and general to provide the solutions to ethical prob-
lems and thus teaching them will not go far in equipping students to identify and solve 
ethical problems. And even when the rules are very detailed, they will always contain 
gaps, suffer from the inherent ambiguity and vagueness of language, while also strug-
gling to deal with the contextual nuances of actual moral dilemmas (on the competing 
advantages and disadvantages of general versus detailed professional codes, see Nicol-
son 2005). Rules thus always need to be complemented by judgment. However, teach-
ing rules does very little to develop such judgment, and nothing to develop moral 
commitment and courage. This approach to teaching seems to naively hope that 
teaching students the rules will lead to obedience simply out of fear of threatened 
sanctions for breaching the rules. But this fear is not a very real one given the difficulty 
of detecting breaches of professional rules (O’Dair 2001, 5; Granfield & Koenig 2002, 
515-57) and the frequently lax approach to those who do so (e.g. Abel 2003, ch9). And, 
even if the fear of sanctions was real, such an approach to developing morality seems 
to be based on now discredited psychological approaches, such as behaviourism and 
social learning theory, which see morality developing from direct teaching, modelling 
by authority figures, and reinforcement by rewards and punishments (e.g. Lapsley & 
Power 2005, passim, but esp. ch10; Carr 1991, 150-155; Kohn 1997). At best such ap-
proaches may inculcate conformity to rules out of habit, but they work best with chil-
dren, not young adults, and with rewards, rather than sanctions - still less with merely 
a threat of only irregularly imposed sanctions. Psychologists generally agree that, ra-
ther than trying to develop morality through external pressure, ethical education 
should focus on encouraging individuals to develop a personally felt commitment to 
doing the right thing. 
b) The Cognitive Approach 
Here there are two main methods. The first is Kohlberg’s cognitive approach (see 
Kohlberg 1976; Kohlberg 1981; Kohlberg 1984; for a good introduction, see Reiner et 
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al. 1983).1 It is based on the idea that moral reasoning develops in stages and that its 
development can be encouraged by exposing students to reasoning at a higher stage 
than that currently displayed and by creating cognitive conflict between their extant 
beliefs and current experiences. This is done through Socratic dialogues and role plays 
dealing with moral dilemmas, which also encourage students to adopt the perspective 
of others. Whereas the conventional approach focuses on knowing the rules, this ap-
proach focuses on understanding the various tools available to resolve ethical dilem-
mas. Thus law students can be exposed to various ethical theories such as deontology, 
utilitarianism, virtue ethics, etc. as well the specialist literature which applies these 
theories to issues of legal ethics. Students then have resources to draw upon where 
there are no rules, when the rules are unclear or even when they regard the rules as 
unethical. If such teaching is backed up extensive exposure to the sort of ethical di-
lemmas which arise in practice, students should become proficient at recognising ethi-
cal problems when they arise and working out how to resolve them through applying 
existing rules and, when they run out or are unclear or controversial, through the tools 
of ethical and applied ethical theory.  
However, for a number of reasons, many contemporary psychologists as well as moral 
philosophers do not regard the cognitive approach as going far enough and/or as prob-
lematic for other reasons (see e.g. Flanagan 1991, chs8-11; Peters 1974; Rest et al. 
1999; Webb 1996; Lapsley and Power 2005 passim; Thomas 1991; Gilligan 2003; Tron-
to 1993; Oser 1991). First, hypothetical problems cannot reproduce the rich complexi-
ty of moral issues which arise in everyday life and particularly in interpersonal rela-
tions. Secondly, role playing in the safe environment of the classroom does not repli-
cate rich real-life situations where individuals are faced with myriad external and in-
ternal pressures to compromise their moral values. Thirdly, according to psychologists, 
moral behaviour results as much from moral sentiments and emotions, such as empa-
thy, pity and compassion, as from rational judgment. Finally, and most importantly, 
moral agents might know what morality requires, but lack the motivation or courage 
to convert such knowledge into behaviour. Empirical research repeatedly confirms that 
knowing what is morally right by no means guarantees moral behaviour (see Rest 
1988, 21-22). In fact, most moral behaviour is a more or less automatic rather than a 
conscious response to moral issues (Peters 1981, ch3; Lapsley & Power 2005, passim). 
Usually one does not consciously recognise a moral issue, weigh up various options, 
decide if acting morally matters to one and then desperately try to stick to one’s prin-
ciples in face of pressure to act immorally. One just instinctively does the right thing.  
c) The Character Approach 
If this is the case, then the question arises as to how law schools can ensure students 
display such automatic responses to moral problems once in practice. According to 
Aristotle (Aristotle 1987), other virtue ethicists (e.g. Kupperman 2005, 203; Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus 1990), the answer lies in fostering students’ moral character so that they 
gradually develop relatively stable character dispositions, or habits of perception, 
thinking feeling and behaviour through actual engagement with moral issues in a way 
similar to how expertise is developed in other walks of life (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1990; 
                                                 
1. Supporters amongst legal educationalists include Richards 1981; Hartwell 1990; Hartwell 1995; 
Abramson 1993. 
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Narvaez & Lapsley 2005). By emulating others, by trial and error, by instruction from 
authoritative others, by experiencing and reflecting on the appropriate pride or regret 
at the outcome of one’s actions, moral habits or dispositions are said to gradually de-
velop to the point that appropriate moral behaviour and feelings become embedded in 
the individual’s character. In other words, character formation results not so much 
from direct teaching but from the experience of frequent immersion in moral dilem-
mas, frequent exercise of one’s moral muscles, and learning from one’s mistakes and 
successes in moral behaviour. Whereas conventional approaches concentrate on 
knowing, cognitive approaches on understanding, character approaches concentrate 
on doing.  
If properly developed, moral character can be said to equip individuals, not just with 
moral sensitivity and judgment, but also moral motivation and courage (Lapsley & 
Power 2005). Where all four moral components are developed to the extent that vir-
tue becomes a way of life, moral behaviour is far more likely to ensue. Thus, moral 
‘saints’, such as Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and Oskar Schindler, seem to act out of deep-
seated and spontaneous feelings of compassion, empathy, etc. – by ‘habits of the 
heart’ – rather than conscious deliberation. This is confirmed by studies of moral ex-
emplars who acted more or less automatically (Oliner & Oliner 1988; Colby & Damon 
1992). According to contemporary psychologists, this automaticity derives from the 
fact that frequent activation renders moral considerations and categories easily acces-
sible and readily utilized (Narvaez & Lapsley 2005, 31). Based on empirical studies, it is 
argued that moral behaviour is more likely for those for whom moral considerations 
are central to their personal identity and sense of self (see Blasi 1995; Lapsley & Power 
2005, passim, but esp. chs 1, 2-4, 9 and 13; Power 1997). For such individuals, immoral 
behaviour will diminish, and moral behaviour will enhance their sense of self and self-
esteem. Indeed, where moral motivations are central to the individual’s self-identity 
moral action is argued to flow from a kind of ‘spontaneous necessity’ without the need 
for willpower or moral courage to overcome temptations or pressures to act unethical-
ly.  
d) Conclusion 
Consequently, it would seem that if law schools are to take professional legal ethics seri-
ously, they should aim at developing moral character in ways which make students more 
likely to display ethical professionalism. While research has yet to be done on whether 
and to what extent universities can positively influence character development, there are 
reasons for optimism (see Davidson 2005, 223). Certainly, as we have seen, they can 
have a negative impact, whereas research does show that, particularly if accompanied 
by ethical instruction and involvement in community projects, universities can have a 
lasting effect on moral judgment (e.g. Abramson 1993; Rest and Narvaez 1994 passim) 
and on moral sensitivity and the related capacity for moral imagination (see Branden-
berger 2005; Bebeau 1994). Admittedly, as already noted, moral reasoning does not 
necessarily translate into behavior. However, there is some, albeit weak, connection 
between the two (Rest et al. 1999, 80ff; Thoma 1994; Blasi 1980) and if universities can 
affect moral reasoning and sensitivity, why not other psychological components? Ad-
mittedly, also, students come to university with fairly well formed moral characters. 
However, given that such character has been developed in response to ethical issues 
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raised by everyday life rather than legal practice there is an opportunity to help adapt 
what can be called personal moral character to the moral demands of practice by creat-
ing professional moral character (Nicolson 2005, 616), especially as law students might be 
prepared to learn from those who they see as experts in law. Nevertheless, it has to be 
recognized that radical changes to a person’s essential character are likely to be rare, so 
there is probably little that universities can do in relation to those who enter university 
with, or quickly develop, a deep-seated cynical attitude to legal practice and hence are 
likely to be impervious to attempts to encourage ethical professional.  
In this light, it would seem that the aim of law schools should be twofold. First, in relation 
to those who enter university with the aim of acting morally and using their skills to bene-
fit others, law schools need to ensure that legal education does not make students cynical 
and provides them with the opportunity to adapt and reinforce their existing moral char-
acter to the ethical demands of legal practice. Secondly, and more ambitiously, law 
schools should seek to influence those without predispositions towards either cynicism or 
ethical professionalism to choose the latter path. Whether they can achieve these goals 
depends on how much time is devoted to ethics in the curriculum, what is taught and 
how. It is to these issues, I now turn. 
4. The What and How of Legal Education 
Ideally, all law students should have some compulsory exposure to legal ethics. Even if 
there is no hope of affecting the moral character of some students, they at least need 
to be made more aware than most currently are of what might constitute unethical 
conduct so that they can make informed choices about risking formal sanctions and 
peer condemnation. If the argument for compulsory ethical education is accepted, the 
first question that needs to be answered is whether ethics should be taught pervasive-
ly throughout the curriculum as and when ethical issue arise in other classes or in 
compulsory dedicated classes. Ideally, as many argue, both approaches should be 
adopted (Nicolson & Webb 1999, 287-8; O’Dair 2001; Webb 1996, 292-4; Webb 1999, 
293-4; Paterson 1995),2 but if a choice has to be made, I would favour the latter. No 
doubt, teaching ethics pervasively redresses its current marginalisation and demon-
strates to students that ethical considerations are integral to legal practice and vary 
according to contextual factors, such as the practice setting, the type of case and the 
client’s status. However, there are well-recognised problems with pervasive teaching. 
By giving ethics a home everywhere, it effectively deprives its core concepts of a home 
anywhere (Bundy 2004, 33). There is therefore a need for a dedicated class to provide 
an in-depth analysis of overarching theoretical and institutional issues, and an intro-
duction to the sort of ethical issues which arise in different contexts such as client con-
fidentiality and conflicts of interest. Moreover, all academics are currently unlikely to 
give ethics the attention it deserves if required to deal with ethical issues relevant to 
their classes. Instead, they are likely to cut corners to ensure adequate coverage of 
their specialist topics and may even make clear their disdain for having to waste pre-
cious time, thus actually making the current situation even worse. Consequently I think 
                                                 
2. On the relative merits and drawbacks of pervasive versus dedicated ethics teaching, see e.g. Boon and 
Levin 2008, ch8; Chapman 2002, 81-2; Moliterno 1991, 119-21; Webb 1998, 290-1; Daly, Green & Pearce 
2004, 197-8). 
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ethics teaching is best left to those who are committed to taking it seriously and this is 
more likely occur within dedicated, hopefully compulsory, but if not optional, classes. 
As I have argued before (Nicolson 2010), such classes should have four aims: inspiring 
an interest in ethics; illuminating the general and professional ethical tools available to 
resolve issues of professional ethics; illustrating these tools and issues through expo-
sure to situations involving moral dilemmas; and inculcating the habit of identifying, 
evaluating and caring about ethical issues so that this becomes a more or less sponta-
neous response in practice.  
As regards illuminating professional ethics, while the formal rules obviously have to be 
taught at some stage, this should occur after students have been exposed to legal eth-
ics literature so that they develop the ability to critically evaluate these rules and their 
underlying morality, apply them in ways which are sensitive to the contexts of legal 
practice and fill in the gaps where they are silent, vague and conflicting. As many rec-
ognise (Boon 2002, 58; Boon and Levin 2008, 176; Goldsmith 1996, 10; Myers 1996; 
Nicolson and Webb 1999; Webb 1996, 277-8; Link 1989, 487; Nicolson 2004), this also 
requires introducing students to various ethical theories which both underlie and may 
challenge dominant approaches in legal ethics (see e.g. Nicolson & Webb 1999, ch2) 
and to the realities of modern legal practice so that students understand problems of 
access to justice and the ways in which various factors like increasing specialisation, 
fragmentation, bureaucratisation, commercialisation and globalisation of legal practice 
affect lawyers’ ability to act ethically (see e.g. Boon and Levin 2008, chs4-8; Granfield 
and Koenig 2002; Nicolson & Webb 1999, ch3 esp. 60-1; Francis 2005).  
While such knowledge can be conveyed in traditional lecture format, interactive teach-
ing methods are more likely to inspire and help students develop their own moral 
stance and moral reasoning. Here, dialogue in small classes will produce deeper under-
standing of issues through exposure to different views (Webb 1998a, 148), whereas 
debates can be brought to life and students ethically inspired by exposure to legal bi-
ographies, fictional accounts of legal practice in literature, films and television or even 
short dramas filmed by academics, and the personal accounts of local lawyers, clients 
and those affected by lawyer behaviour (Johnstone & Treuthart 1991, 100-1; Menkel-
Meadow 1999, 61, 64-6; Menkel-Meadow 2000; Gillers 1995; Spaeth et al 1996, 159-
60; Bennett 1995; Mixon & Schuwerk 1995).  
When it comes to developing moral sensitivity and judgment, role plays and simula-
tions are more likely to engage their interest and emotions and hence potentially de-
velop moral commitment than the discussion of hypothetical scenarios (Sprinthall 
1994; Richards, 1981). This is because, according to adult learning theory, learning is 
more profound where student experiences are more personal, immediate and realistic, 
and relate to the fulfilment of their future social roles (Block 1982). This is particularly 
so if such experience is accompanied by the critical evaluation of their performance by 
others in class and by the self in reflective journals (Aiken 1997; Webb 1998b, 289-90; 
Spiegelman 1988; Lesnick 1990, 1184-5). Learning is also more profound when prior 
assumptions and settled values jar with experienced reality causing ‘disorienting mo-
ments’ involving moral crises and cognitive conflict (Quigley 1995; Webb 1996, 282). 
By encouraging participants to see issues from the ‘other side’ role-playing may en-
courage the development, not only of moral judgment, as emphasised by Kohlberg, 
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but also empathy and other emotional sentiments (Goldsmith 1996, 13), which virtue 
ethicists and others see as so important to morality (Rest 1994, 389; Nicolson & Webb 
1992, ch2 passim). This is particularly likely in ongoing and realistic simulations. When 
the results seem to ‘count’ in contexts which accurately reflect practice, students are 
more likely to emotionally invest in and learn from their experiences (Moliterno 1991, 
117-8; Noone & Dickson 2001).  
However, it is generally accepted that ethical learning is best achieved in student law 
clinics, (see Aiken 1997, 47; Boon 2002, 60; Webb 1998b, 296; Rhode 1995, 141, and 
more generally, Condlin 1983, 80, 320-24; Duncan 2002; Luban & Millemann 1995; 
Jewell 1984, 507-10; Glennon 1992). By engaging with actual clients, students are far 
more likely to develop the empathy and emotional maturity which is so important to 
ethical behaviour. Lessons learnt are likely to go deeper when students bear responsi-
bility for decisions which have consequences in the ‘real’ world and where the pres-
ence of flesh and blood clients with actual problems make learning seem more useful 
than traditional legal education. Moreover, because of their perceived practical 
knowledge and skills, clinic supervisors may function as influential moral exemplars, 
modelling good client relations, concern for how their actions affect others, and an 
altruistic commitment to the community. And, crucially for character development, 
any feelings of satisfaction or regret at their actions in representing actual clients and 
resolving real dilemmas may affect character development, whereas clinics reveal the 
extent of unmet legal need, and social and legal injustice, that legal practice can in-
volve helping others, and that this can be rewarding as well as intellectually challeng-
ing. Thus, according to the anecdotal evidence of many clinicians, and my one experi-
ence, clinical work may inspire, or at least reinforce, altruistic aspirations in students 
(Johnstone, 537; Rees 1975, 136; Guggenheim 1995, 683; Kotkin 1997; Maresh 1997; 
Styles & Zariska 2001; Tranter 2002, 13).  
5. The Extra-Curricular Law Clinic Route to Ethical Education and Character Develop-
ment 
a) The University of Strathclyde Law Clinic 
However, an important barrier in the way of clinics as the main forum for ethical edu-
cation and character development is the perception that they are expensive to run. In 
addition to premises and related expenses, staff are required to train and supervise 
students and to administer the clinics more generally. Consequently, most law clinics 
have relatively small numbers of students working on cases at any one time and stu-
dents are usually involved for between three months to a year. While I have already 
stated that the opportunity for positively influencing students’ moral development is 
limited to those whose characters are amenable to being influenced towards ethical 
professionalism, by describing the clinic I established at the University of Strathclyde 
(itself an expansion on the model I developed at the University of Bristol), I will offer a 
clinical model which greatly expands the potential for law clinics to have a positive 
impact on ethical education and character development.3  
                                                 
3. For a more detailed argument in favour of the ethical, as well as other benefits of extra-curricular law 
clinics, see Nicolson 2006. 
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The University of Strathclyde Law Clinic (henceforth the USLC) has around 200 stu-
dents, many of whom remain members for almost five years. By contrast to the high 
staff-student ratio of most law clinics,4 these students are supervised by the equivalent 
of only one full-time supervisor. The only other staff involvement takes the form of an 
administrator and the two to three hours I devote to the Clinic every day as its Direc-
tor. Nevertheless, the Clinic takes on around 160 cases a year in a wide variety of areas 
of law and provides not just advice but also representation up to and including court 
and employment tribunals. It is able to provide such an extensive service because so 
much clinic administration is undertaken by the students. They are responsible for re-
cruitment, training, development, external relations, IT support and case allocation, as 
well as ensuring that cases are run properly and that inexperienced students are sup-
ported in handling cases. Supervisors check all documents and discuss strategy in the 
handling of cases, but students work mainly on their own in pairs and with the assis-
tance of more experienced mentors.  
The USLC operates this way because, unlike most other clinics which are primarily 
aimed at teaching students about law and legal skills, its primary objectives are to max-
imise the provision of legal services to those most in need in society and to inspire a 
new generation of lawyers with a sense of ethical professionalism. Thus, student in-
volvement is almost entirely voluntary and only those have already displayed a com-
mitment to their clients and social justice can gain some credit for their clinic work. 
Arguably, by putting social needs before education, the USLC avoids the implicit mes-
sage conveyed by clinics aimed primarily at legal training that it is the students’ inter-
ests – now educational but later financial - that take precedence over those of clients 
and community. Moreover, the length of membership means that students will take 
on many more cases that most clinics (one student had conducted over 30), whereas 
the fact that six students each year mentor around 30 or so other students, and 
around 20 also serve on the Clinic’s committee which decides ethical dilemmas, means 
that exposure to issues of ethics and justice is also likely to be much greater than in 
clinics which are devoted to educational aims.  
Admittedly, the potential for fostering ethical professionalism in clinics will be serious-
ly under-utilised unless students are exposed to a theoretical basis to help them make 
sense of their experiences. Thus, without being alerted to the sort of ethical dilemmas 
which arise in practice, students might overlook those staring them in the face, where-
as without exposure to a wide variety of ethical theories or positions on issues of legal 
ethics, they will not have the opportunity to explore alternative approaches to resolv-
ing dilemmas and to develop their own sense of professional values in order to sup-
plement or even supplant existing professional roles and rules.  
Moreover, according to clinical educational theorists ‘learning occurs not in the doing 
but in the reflection and conceptualisation that takes place during and after the event’ 
(Brayne, Duncan & Grimes 1998, 47; see also Webb 1996, 289-90; Spiegelman 1988, 
243-70; Lesnick 1990, 1184-5). Such reflection, aided by the critical evaluation of oth-
ers, may help students develop the life-long learning skills of the reflective practitioner 
(see e.g. Schon 1983). Thus according to Kolb’s well-known learning circle, (Kolb, 
                                                 
4. In the US, 54% of law clinics surveyed had a staff-student ratio of between 1:8 and 1:10, with 16% 
even having a ratio of less than 1: 6: (McDiarmid, 1990, 254-5). 
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1984), reflection may lead to the adoption of new, or the adaptation of existing, theo-
ries about how to handle issues which can then be put into practice when similar situa-
tions arise. This new experience provides the material for further reflection, theory 
adaption and theory testing, and so on.  
Currently, the opportunity for such ethical teaching and reflection is limited to one 
class, Clinical Legal Practice (henceforth CLP), which is the only one in the LLB which 
discusses lawyers’ ethics and which is only open to USLC members who have under-
taken at least two clinic cases. CLP involves seminars on ethics and access to justice, 
surgeries to discuss cases and is assessed though an essay examining the issues of jus-
tice and/or ethics raised by an actual case, case files and a diary, in which students 
reflect on their experience in class and the USLC.  
b) The impact of ethics teaching and clinical experience on student moral develop-
ment 
In a recent paper (Nicolson 2010), I analysed 23 of these reflective diaries, using a form 
of grounded theory (Bryman 2008, 56ff.). This analysis revealed both that ethics teach-
ing can influence students attitudes and more importantly that clinics provide an excel-
lent means of teaching ethics and, while it is too early to be certain, may also start a 
process which leads to a sense of ethical professionalism becoming embedded in the 
student’s character dispositions.  
Thus the diaries revealed that the students were frequently stimulated by the CLP class 
to reflect on their personal values and ethical orientation, and how they might play out 
in practice, with many admitting to not having previously considered their motivating 
moral values, various issues of legal ethics and professionalism, and even the justice of 
the legal system. Thus, a seminar made one student realise that: ‘my ideals to altruism 
will be tested when I start practicing as a lawyer.... I suppose I have been naïve to think 
that I could uphold my ideals and still become a successful lawyer. The seminar set me 
thinking seriously about the kind of lawyer I wanted to be and what my values really 
are.’ 
Many reflected on, and were influenced in their attitudes to, career choice, leading 
some to question and even change decision to join commercial law firms, and others 
to confirm their pre-existing desire to help those in need when in practice. This impact 
on student attitudes is particularly important, given that career choice is likely to be a 
lawyer’s most significant ethical decision, determining both the type of moral dilemmas 
they are likely to face and the likely constraints on their ability to display moral integrity 
and altruism.  
Many students also altered their initial ethical views about, for example, the accepta-
bility of lawyers putting aside moral issues in practice or about prevailing models of 
client relations. As one student stated: 
‘In Week 3 [of the CLP class] I was adamant that it was above and beyond the call of 
duty to show concern or compassion for the my clients however in week 8 I found that 
my new case partner shared the same view which I used to possess. ... in other words, 
‘if the client doesn’t tell us all the information then that’s their fault’. .... When I ex-
plained to him that it wouldn’t be fair to judge the client by our personal standards I 
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realised that I no longer agreed with my old perception of clients ... [A]fter working 
with different clinic members and the Clinical Legal Practice class I can appreciate that 
there are circumstances beyond the client’s control and I should not judge them by my 
own standards.’ 
Clinic cases - both past and current, both students’ own and those of others discussed 
in class - were a rich source of material for reflection and learning on issues of ethics. A 
wide variety of ethical issues arising in cases were discussed. In addition to the obvious 
dilemmas of being required to adopt unethical tactics and pursue immoral client ends, 
every student faced issues involving how to deal with clients in caring and non-
paternalistic ways.  
How these issues were resolved demonstrates the value of teaching ethics before, 
alongside or after student immersion in real life cases. Most directly, teachers and su-
pervisors intervened to challenge student attitudes. Less directly, students used their 
reading and class insights to question their actions in past cases and to handle current 
dilemmas. For example, the value of an ethics class was dramatically experienced by 
one student, whose assertion of the value of tolerance in class a mere hour before 
interviewing a client inspired him to do all he could to help, notwithstanding that he 
considered the client to be untruthful and manipulative. Two months later, after 
standing up to an aggressive opponent trying to pressurise him into acting without 
instructions, he specifically acknowledged that, compared to his partner who had not 
taken CLP, he had found it ‘easier to make decisions on how to act in this situation 
mainly due to the knowledge I have gained through the CLP course.’ Similarly, faced 
with the option of what she described as the ‘dirty trick’ of using a former colleague 
who had to resign due to racial bullying in support of her client’s claim of racial dis-
crimination, another student cited chapter and verse of seminar reading to justify us-
ing her morality to ‘filter what I find to be immoral instructions’ and finding out 
through ‘moral dialogue’ that her client also wanted to ‘do the right thing’. Five weeks 
later, however, after discovering that the defenders had lied to her, she methodically 
applied the contextual approach to ethics encountered in her reading (see Nicolson & 
Webb 1999, chs8-10) and reversed her earlier view. She also noted that her partner 
who had been taught ethics in the professional training course ‘did not view the mat-
ter as involving morality’, commenting that this was ‘a blatant example of the benefits 
of Clinical Legal Practice and Law Clinic Education’. 
The diaries also reveal that clinical experience gives rise to various factors which en-
hance character development, such as student feelings of satisfaction or regret at their 
conduct of cases. Feelings of satisfaction were particularly important in encouraging 
student to think about pursuing careers in which they could help others. According to 
one student, law clinics may enthuse ‘the many students [who] enter the profession 
with a genuine desire to tackle society’s access to justice problems’. Another stated 
that by exposing her ‘to the wide variety of options other than commercial law’ the 
USLC helped her to discover a ‘social conscience’: 
‘I didn’t start my law degree to ‘make a difference’. My goal was simply to earn enough 
money so I can afford some of life’s luxuries and have no financial troubles. However, 
having seen the positive effect my time and effort has had on clients of the clinic has 
DONALD NICOLSON. Teaching legal ethics: what, how and why  
REVISTA DE EDUCACIÓN Y DERECHO. EDUCATION AND LAW REVIEW  Número 1. Octubre 2009- Marzo 2010 
Fecha de entrada: 19-01-2009 Fecha de aceptación: 02-02-2010 
15 15 
changed my perspective and now, my ultimate goal is to find a job that provides both 
financial security and a chance to help communities or less fortunate individuals.’ 
Similarly a third student admitted that before his experience in the USLC he imagined a 
career in a large law firm and ‘hadn’t really considered the larger ideal of social jus-
tice.... Now I find it impossible not to.’ 
The diaries also confirm some of the suggested advantages of extra-curricular clinics 
which are oriented towards providing social justice rather than educating students. In 
the USLC, all experienced students mentor and sometime supervise inexperienced 
members, thus increasing the number of cases to which students are exposed. Indeed, 
a few students referred to learning from cases in which they acted as mentors and 
using their experience and learning to engage less experienced students in what they 
themselves described (no doubt influenced by their seminar reading) as moral appren-
ticeships.   
Also important to a moral apprenticeship is the impact of role models. Here a number 
of students cited the examples given by their teachers who combine voluntary legal 
work with work as lawyers or academics as inspiring them both in career choice and to 
work hard for their clients. Students also referred to the USLC’s social justice orienta-
tion. Thus, for a student faced with jeopardising his career by suing a law firm: 
‘The [USLC’s] altruistic ethos helped to reinforce my beliefs and allowed me to feel 
comfortable making a selfless decision in a profession surrounded by greed and self-
importance. Without the Clinic to strengthen and normalise my beliefs I do not know if 
I would have had the courage and conviction to act outside the norm. In the future, I 
will try to use the Clinic as an example to justify acting altruistically rather than suc-
cumbing to peer pressure.’ 
6. Conclusion 
As this example of the exercise of moral courage shows, the USLC might have started a 
process of professional moral character development. At the least, however, the dia-
ries show that teaching can raise ethical awareness, equip students to deal with ethical 
issues and even affect (at least professed) ethical views and (at least in the context of 
the university environment) behaviour. They also show that live-client clinics expose 
students to a wide range of ethical issues, particularly in relation to the appropriate 
relationship with clients, which may provide new, or deepen existing, insights into legal 
ethics, particularly if accompanied or followed by teaching and reflection. Clearly, their 
clinical experience reinforced the ethical orientation and career plans of some stu-
dents, but it also seemed to alter that of others, and in some cases, even affected their 
behaviour. In other words, the diaries provide some empirical support for many of the 
alleged advantages of law clinics in terms of ethical education and character develop-
ment.  
Nevertheless, for a number of reasons one cannot ignore other forms of ethical educa-
tion. First, as I have already recognised, more general ethical teaching reinforces and 
helps make sense of clinic experience. Secondly, even with the USLC’s model of run-
ning an extra-curricular law clinic using student volunteers, it would take a tripling of 
resources to expose all University of Strathclyde law students to clinical experience. In 
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the current economic climate, such investment seems highly unlikely and hence some 
exposure to legal ethics even if not accompanied by clinical experience must certainly 
be better than none. Thirdly, legal education is currently so far from taking ethics seri-
ously that any means of illuminating and illustrating professional legal ethics and in-
spiring student interest is worth pursuing even if it does not necessarily inculcate the 
sort of habits of moral conscience I have argued for in this article.  
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